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RECENT CASE NOTES
that she never had a common law right against the loss caused by the
negligence of a third person. But such a doctrine seems to be more or less
gratuitous. Since the wife was under disabilities to sue for loss of con-
sortium in any case, there is little basis for the assumption. In other
words, it is assumed that if she could have maintained any action at all,
the courts would have distinguished between a direct attack on her right
of consortium and a loss which resulted from negligence.
From the standpoint of logic, the distinction seems unsound. The
courts denying to both the cause of action are by far more logical.'S It
is hard to conceive of any public policy against such an action.D This
basic principle, however, is so firmly intrenched that if any change is to
be made it will probably be the result of legislation. It might be noticed
that in the principal case the appellant alleged that the injuries were in-
flicted wantonly and with malice. A few recent cases have allowed re-
covery in such a case.20 The Indiana court, however, disposes of this
argument with but little comment. Logically it should make no difference,
but it may give the courts something to tie to, in case they decide to give
the wife her just relief. C. M.
TORT CLAIMS AS OPERATING EXPENSES GIVEN PRIORITY OVER MORTGAGE
LIENS AS TO EARNINGS OF A STREET RAILWAY COMPANY IN RECEIVER'S
HANDS-Appellants filed claims based on injuries to persons and damages
to property arising out of the operation of the Union Traction Company
prior to the appointment of a receiver. Appellants claimed a right to
preference and priority of payment as a part of the usual, natural and
ordinary operating expense of the railroad, and that the mortgagees took
their mortgages with the understanding that all railroad operating expenses
were to be paid out of current revenues before such mortgages had any
claim upon such revenues. Held, claims against the railway company for
injuries to persons and damages to property before, as well as after,
appointment of receiver therefor are "operating expenses" entitled to
priority over mortgages in payment.1
While there is no precedent in Indiana law for this decision, upon
analysis of other authority and of the principles involved, it seems to be a
desirable result.
That operating expenses constitute a preferred claim on moneys received
from such operation is well settled.2 As to just what claims shall constitute
Holmes v. Holmes (1893), 133 Ind. 386, 32 N. E. 932; Dietyman v. Mullin (1900),
108 Ky. 610, 57 S. W. 247; Smith v. Smith (1897), 98 Tenn. 101, 33 S. W. 439;
Hodgkinson v. Hodgidnson (1895), 43 Neb. 269, 61 N. W. 577.
13These states are Michigan, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island.
See Marri v. Stamford St. R. Co. (1911), 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582; Bolger v. Boston
Elevated Ry. Co. (1910), 205 Mass. 420, 91 N. E. 389; Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods
Co. (1915), 184 Mich. 304, 151 N. W. 724; Golden v. R. L. Green Paper Co. (1922),
44 R. I. 231, 116 Atl. 579.
19Holbrook, The Change In the Meaning of Consortium (1923), 22 Mich. L.
Rev. 1.
z'Flandermeyer v. Cooper (1912), 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N. E. 102; Moberg v.
Scott (1917), 38 S. D. 422, 161 N. W. 998.
'McCullough v. Union Traction Co. of Indiana, Supreme Court of Indiana, 1933,
186 N. E. 300.2 Jones, Mortgages, Sec. 827; Clark v. Central Railroad & Banking Co. of
Georgia (1895), 66 Fed. 803 (C. C. A., 5th) ; Texas & Pacific Railway Company v.
Johnson (1890), 16 Tex. 421, 13 S. W. 463, 18 Am. St. Rep. 60.
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operating expenses, the authorities have not been in complete harmony.
At an early date even the right of employees to have their wages paid out
of earnings while the road was in receivership was disputed, but it was
finally allowed on the ground of public policy. 3 Liens of materialmen were
denied priority until the case of Fosdick v. Schall4 which has been widely
followed.5 Some courts allowed priority for liens of supply claimants but
denied it to tort claimants on the ground that while the former was neces-
sary to the continued operation of the road, "to keep the road a going
concern,"
6 the latter had no such basis.
Those courts which have denied preference to tort claims have advanced
the following reasons for their decisions: that such claims are not based
on any consideration accruing to the benefit of the mortgage security or
tending to preserve or enhance its value,7 nor are they incident to running
the railroad, nor to procuring traffic,8 that to sustain such claims, it must
be held that the bondholders impliedly assumed liability for negligence of
the railroad company, 9 or that the claimants have superior equitiesO and
that such claims are not only not necessary, but are actually deleterious to
operation."1
The underlying problem in all these cases is suggested by one or two of
the above reasons: that to allow tort claims a prior lien over the mortgage
creditors is, in effect, to make the latter pay for wrongs not committed
by them, but by the railroad company. The arguments which meet this
position most squarely are presented in the principal case: that the mort-
gagees accept their mortgages with full knowledge that all legal liabilities
resulting from operation and all necessary expenses are to be paid before
any of the earnings are available for mortgage debts; among such legal
liabilities is that of claims and judgments for accidents and injuries to
persons and property, unavoidable risks in the operation of the business.
Such claims are considered operating expenses when the company itself
runs the road or when the receiver runs it12 and there is no sound reason
for classing them otherwise because they arose a short time before a
receiver was appointed.
Many other reasons have been advanced by various courts to justify
decisions in accord with the principal case. One of the more conspicuous
is that the mortgagee is in privity voluntarily with the tortfeasor, while
gDouglass v. Cline (1876), 12 Bush. 608 (Ky.).
4 (1878), 9 Otto (99 U. S.) 235.
'Hale v. Frost (1878), 99 U. S. 389; Citizens Trust Company v. National
Equipment & Supply Co. (1912), 178 Ind. 167, 98 N. E. 865, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.)
695; Turner v. Indianapolis, B. & W. Ry. Co. (1878), 24 Fed. 366 (D. C. Ind. and
S. D. I1.), 8 Biss. 315.
'Easton v. Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. (1889), 38 Fed. 12 (C. C., B. D. Texas).
* St. Louis Trust Company v. Riley (1895), 70 Fed. 32 (C. C. A., 8th).
'Davenport v. Alabama & C. R. Co. (1875), 2 Woods 519, 7 Fed. 8 (C. C.,
S. D. Ala.).
9Hale v. Frost (1878), 99 U. S. 389.
10Hiles v. Case, Receiver (1880), 14 Fed. 141 (D. C., E. D. Wis.).
" St. Louis Trust Company v. Riley (1895), 70 Fed. 32 (C. C. A., 8th).
12Cowdrey v. R. R. Co. (1876), 93 U. S. 352, 23 L. ed. 950; Klein & Wife v.
Jewett (1875), 26 N. J. Eq. 474; Texas & Pacific Railway Company v. Johnson
(1890), 16 Tex. 421, 13 S. W. 463, 18 Am. St. Rep. 60; Mobile & Ohio Railroad
Company v. A. Davis (1884), 62 Miss. 271; Ex. parte Brown & Wife (1880), 15
S. C. 518.
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the accident victim certainly is not and there is a strong equity in favor
of an involuntary creditor.13 Also, there is involved in such cases an
important public policy in the security of the people---"Salus populi suprem&
lex"-outweighing that of keeping the railroad a "going concern."'14 Fur-
thermore, the very income in question was produced by exercising the
franchise granted by the state to the railroad company, to which adhere
inseparably certain duties and liabilities and which is answerable, out of
revenues produced by its exercise, for torts commited in its exercise.1 5
While cotra cases go on the theory of benefit to the mortgagee, they dis-
regard altogether the correlative burdens.16 Receivership is an equitable
doctrine and must be administered equitably,17 and tort claims, being of a
peculiarly meritorious nature,'5 should be favorably considered by chancery.
By coming into equity to ask receivership, the mortgage creditors agreed
to submit to all superior equities and to all necessary incidents of good
management, one of which is payment of valid tort claims.19 The liability
which the law creates in such cases is not inferior in merit to a debt arising
out of a contract. 2 0
The tendency of the later and better-reasoned cases is to allow tort
claims to be classed as operating expenses and, as such, given priority over
mortgage liens, so that the decision in the principal case seems right on
authority (though the cases are not numerous) and on principle. M. C. M.
RES JUDICATA-PRIVIES-WHAT MIGHT HAvE BEEN ADJUDICATED WAS
ADJUDIcATED-After the death of a testator in 1905, the trustees under
his will brought an action in 1906 for the construction thereof, making the
widow, daughter and the daughter's two children parties defendant. The
court construed the will to provide a life estate in the income from the
land to the widow, a certain sum for life to the daughter if she should
survive, and the trustees to retain title to the land until the two grand-
children, who were specifically named in the will, reached twenty-one, pay-
ing them support, etc., and the fee to go to them on attaining that age.
The widow survived the daughter, dying in 1929. Shortly thereafter, appel-
lants, sons of the daughter by a later marriage and not in being at the
time of testator's death, filed a partition suit alleging that they were each
owners of an undivided one-fourth of the real estate. The lower court held
they were bound by the prior judgment. On appeal, they contend that the
court did not actually determine whether the provisions as to the trustee's
holding title until the appellees, the two named grandchildren, were twenty-
one was a restraint on alienation, and hence, the decree was not
res judicata. Held, bound by the prior decree.'
This holding is entirely in accord with a long line of Indiana authorities,
and is a recognition of the rule that "what might have been adjudicated
13Green v. Coast Line R. Co. (1895), 97 Ga. 15, 24 S. E. 814.
2A Ibid.
Ibid.Is Ibid.
V Fosdick v. Schall (1878), 9 Otto (99 U. S.) 235.
I Ex parte Brown (1880), 15 S. C. 518.
'9Ibid.
2 Ibid.
Reynolds v. Lee Appellate Court of Indiana, June 28, 1933, 186 N. E. 337.
